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A concern for human rights shouldn't lead 
us to extol the ‘joys’ of the liberal 
capitalism of which they're an integral 
part. There's no democratic state that's 
not compromised to the very core by its 
part in generating human misery.1 
I seek to provide an explanation for the 
disjunction between the lived realities 
of marginalised, displaced and 
impoverished collectivities in the neo-
colonial South African nation state and 
the language, politics and practices of 
human or constitutional rights that 
represent them. I focus on individuals
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and groups and their struggles to participate in decisions affecting their needs and 
material existence, in the absence of assistance by public interest litigation, formalised 
civil society organisations or organised social movements, while facing economic 
constraints, complicated legal and political processes, and being bound to dismal 
structural and spatial conditions. I argue that individual/collective bodies suffer from 
everyday violence and that the modernist legal construction of the subject “derealises” 
their suffering and silences their needs. Therefore, I aim to examine some of the human 
rights discursive and non-discursive practices that produce the body as a subject of 
constitutional rights2 in the context of the neo-colonial South African nation state, and 
to question how to “realise” the suffering of the individual and of groups. 
Before I commence my discussion it is necessary to explain what is meant by the 
“derealising” or invisibility of the individual/collective body and the everyday violence 
experienced by it. Judith Butler links her theory of performativity3 with precarity or 
“conditions that threaten life in ways that appear to be outside of one’s control”.4 She 
stresses that although the State is designed to address the needs of the population, it 
may also adopt global and internal measures whereby segments of the population are 
treated differentially leading to injury, violence and vulnerability. Butler’s question as to 
who counts as a subject is significant in the context of individual/collective bodies living 
in shack settlements on the boundaries of modern South African cities, who daily face 
                                                 
2 For the purposes of this article I will refer mostly to constitutional rights which include the categories of 
civil, political and socio-economic rights. The example I use (that of the women of the Marikana area) is 
indicative of an infringement of civil-political rights, socio-economic rights and environmental rights. It 
should, however, be said that the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (the Constitution) 
guarantees a wide variety of socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights, and the State has the same 
obligations to respect, protect, promote and fulfil socio-economic rights as it does civil and political rights. 
For a detailed discussion see Liebenberg S Socio-Economic Rights Adjudication under a transformative 
Constitution (2010). 
3 Butler J Bodies that matter: On the discursive limits of "sex" (2003) at 2-3, argues in terms of her notion of 
performativity that the body is discursively constructed by language. Her argument is based on Michel 
Foucault’s conception of juridical power, which claims that juridical systems of power produce the 
subjects they afterwards represent. She further argues that “the subjects regulated by such structures are, 
by virtue of being subjected to them, formed, defined, and reproduced in accordance with the 
requirements of those structures”. If this is the case, she continues, “the juridical formation of language 
and politics that represent[s] the individual as a subject is in itself a discursive formation and effect of a 
given version of representationalist politics” (Butler J Gender trouble: Feminism and the subversion of 
identity (1990) at 2). In terms of Butler’s notions of performativity, human rights discourse, which is 
based on the juridical form of negative power, defines and reproduces the subject in accordance with the 
requirements of the system (Butler J “Foucault and the paradox of bodily inscriptions” (1989) 86 Journal 
of Philosophy 601). Hence, the formation of language and politics that represents the impoverished body 
as a subject of rights becomes a discursive formation taking the form of representationalist politics 
(Butler (1990) at 2). In doing so the impoverished “subject” turns out to be discursively constituted by 
the same system that is supposed to facilitate the social and economic emancipation of the “subject”. The 
subject of rights in terms of Butler’s notion of performativity can access socio-economic rights only 
through a form of representationalist politics, and as such it delegitimises and renders the subject as sub-
human and immobilises, excludes, silences and stigmatises her in the decisions affecting her needs and 
the structural conditions intrinsic to her daily life. This results in liberal managerialism of the 
impoverished body. 
4 Butler J Frames of war (2009) at 25-26.; Butler J “Performativity, precarity and sexual politics” (2009) 4 
Revista de Antropología Iberoamericana at i. 
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economic hardship and everyday violence despite being the bearers of constitutional 
rights.5 She explains that  
[P]erformativity has everything to do with “who” can become produced as a recognizable subject, a 
subject who is living, whose life is worth sheltering and whose life, when lost, would be worthy of 
mourning.  
She further asserts that “precarious life characterizes such lives who do not qualify as 
recognizable, readable, or grievable”.6 She therefore poses the question of who counts 
as a subject and whose lives are real? In Butler’s sense bodies situated in shack 
settlements, who have no, or limited, access to public interest litigation and are faced 
with dealing with complicated legal and political processes to participate in decisions 
affecting their material existence, have been “derealised”.7 Drucilla Cornell, in her 
interviews with S’Bu Zikode, leader of the shack dwellers’ movement in South Africa, 
quotes Zikode as arguing that “[t]he systematic oppression of the majority of South 
Africans has disappeared from the official political discourse of the country”. Cornell 
therefore asks how the suffering, or what she calls day-to-day violence, can be 
“derealised”? She argues that social movements in South Africa, like that of Zikode, are 
aimed to “make lives matter in Butler’s sense, so that the systematicity of violence 
against the poor, not only as a depravation but also as police force, can be seen and 
named as violence”.8 
Gilles Deleuze rejects the idea of a defined and ahistorical list of invented human 
rights and the traditions that advance human rights - what Deleuze refers to as human 
rights discourse.9 He argues that the outrages which people have suffered are not the 
violation of abstract rights but are real monstrous cases.10  Deleuze is therefore not only 
concerned with “capital C catastrophes, i.e., the kind of major outrage associated with 
human rights, but also with everyday violence”.11 For him human rights discourse 
sustains this second kind of violence because it is premised on the person as a closed 
concept of representational thought.12 In other words, when individual/collective 
bodies have limited or no access to water, sanitation, shelter, adequate food and 
healthcare and continually struggle to access complicated legal and political systems,13 
                                                 
5 Butler (2009) at iv. 
6 Butler (2009) at xii. 
7 Cornell D “The politics of grieving” (21 May 2011) Social Text. Available at 
http://www.socialtextjournal.org/periscope/2011/05/politics-of-grieving---drucilla-cornell.php 
(accessed 24 November 2012). 
8 Cornell (21 May 2011). 
9 Deleuze G “On Human Rights” (1996) Generation-Online: extract from L'Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze, avec 
Claire Parnet, Vidéo Éd. Montparnasse; Patton Deleuzian concepts philosophy, colonization, politics (2010) 
at 151-152; Lefebvre A “Human rights in Deleuze and Bergson’s later philosophy” in de Sutter L & McGee 
K (eds) Deleuze and law (2012) 48 at 51. 
10 Deleuze G & Parnet C Dialogues (tr Tomlinson H & Habberjam B) (1987). 
11 Lefebvre (2012) at 51. 
12 Lefebvre (2012) at 51. 
13 Such as formalised civil society organisations, organised social movements and assistance by NGOs and 
public interest litigation NGOs. 
RIGHTS DISCOURSE, VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL PROTESTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Page | 4  
 
this infringement is an infringement not merely of their constitutional rights, but it is 
also a form of systematic and structural violence that accompanies their everyday living, 
placing their very existence in danger. Deleuze therefore criticises (human) rights 
discourse as a pure abstraction stripped of meaning and unresponsive to attempts to 
move it beyond the formal legal construct of a subject in thought.14 Put differently, our 
faith in human rights prevents us from seeing the suffering of others and justifies 
everyday violence as part of the natural ordering of economic affairs in a constitutional 
state.15  
In what follows I commence the article with a discussion of the relationship 
between neo-liberal capitalism, complex legal organisation and the rising number of 
social protests in South Africa. I use the example of the shack settlements on the 
outskirts of South African cities and specifically focus on the lethal and everyday 
violence experienced by marginalised, impoverished, female individuals and groups in 
the area of Marikana, Rustenburg in the North-West Province. It is not the purpose of 
this article to focus on the Marikana massacre, the event that occurred on the day of the 
16th of August, but rather to focus on the everyday violence experienced by the women 
of Marikana after the loss of their spouses. 
This is followed by a discussion of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s machinic 
ontology to illustrate how different assemblages produce the subject. Deleuze and 
Guattari present a different way of thinking about individuals and groups, their 
connections with each other and their milieus.16 Deleuze and Guattari in What is 
philosophy? describe philosophy as the creation of a new concept, where this concept “in 
itself call[s] for a future form, for a new earth and people that do not yet exist”.17 Their 
concepts provide us with a “collection of potentialities, which can only be affirmed in 
their use”.18 I focus on their concepts “minority”, “majority” and “the state apparatus” to 
illustrate how collective bodies are captured, ordered and dealt with by the modernist 
legal construction of the subject, because they do not conform to the standard of the 
majority whereby the rights and duties of citizens are measured by the axioms of a 
capitalist society. 
                                                 
14 Deleuze “On Human Rights” (1996). Available at http://www.generation-
online.org/p/fpdeleuze10.htm (accessed 22 October 2012). 
15 Patton explains that Deleuze does not oppose human rights proper but criticises the manner in which 
rights are represented. Patton (2010) at 23 and 152. 
16 Deleuze and Guattari extended “complexity theory” or the notion of self-organising material systems in 
scientific research to the social, linguistic, political and economic realm. For them, social systems do not 
require transcendent organising agents such as gods, leaders, capital or subjects. Bonta M & Protevi J 
Deleuze and geophilosophy (2004) at 3-7. 
17 Deleuze G & Guattari F “What is philosophy?” (1994) 2 at 108. 
18 Hickey-Moody A & Malins P “Introduction: Gilles Deleuze and four movements in social thought” in 
Hickey-Moody A & Malins P (eds) Deleuzian encounters: Studies in contemporary social issues (2007) at 2; 
Watson J “Theorising European ethnic politics with Deleuze and Guattari” in Buchanan I & Thoburn N 
(eds) Deleuze and Politics (2008) at 201. 
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2 NEO-LIBERAL CAPITALISM, SOCIAL PROTESTS AND VIOLENCE 
2.1 Introduction 
South Africa is one of the most inegalitarian societies in the world and the gap between 
rich and poor is still strongly correlated with differences of race.19 Referring to Rosa 
Luxemburg, Cornell explains that “capitalism must always produce a surplus population 
both for the sake of dumping excess goods, and thus for solving ‘underconsumption,’ 
and for the sake of finding a work force that can be ‘superexploited’”. 20  She continues to 
explain that in South Africa with its legacy of colonialism and apartheid, the surplus 
consists of those who are excluded from the formal first and the informal second 
economy, and that this should be understood as “an inevitable result of the dynamics of 
neoliberal capitalism”.21 One of the consequences of neo-liberal capitalism is the 
escalating incidence of social protests in South Africa.22 Organised23 and spontaneous 
movements24 turn to social protest when threatened with eviction, when evicted by 
forceful measures. They express their continued struggle to access basic needs, such as, 
water, sanitation and energy and/or to express their discontent with poor service 
delivery, structural living conditions, inaccessible bureaucratic systems and 
complicated, often prejudicial, political networks.25 These protests are often 
unconnected and have no overreaching political aim. They are also over-simplified by 
the popular media and depicted as service delivery protests.26  Jean Comaroff contends 
that these social movements “in the wake of the growing spectre of [human] 
disposability” signify a struggle for “the basic right to exist,” although this struggle is 
                                                 
19 Bangstad S, Eriksen T, Comaroff J & Comaroff JJ “’Anthropologists are talking’: about anthropology and 
post-apartheid South Africa” (2012) 77 Ethnos: Journal of Anthropology 115 at 129. The current Gini 
coefficient in South Africa is 0.69; see National Planning Commission (20 December 2012) National 
Development Plan; Milanovic B The haves and the have-nots: A brief and Idiosyncratic history of global 
inequality (2011) at 29-30. 
20 Cornell (21 May 2011).  
21 See also Harvey D A brief history of neoliberalism (2005) at 23; Bond P Talk left, walk right: South 
Africa’s frustrated global reforms (2006) at 4-10; O'Conell P “The death of socio-economic rights” (2011) 
74 Modern Law Review 532 at 551-552. 
22 Alexander P “A massive rebellion of the poor” Mail & Guardian 13 April 2013; See also, Centre for Civil 
Society (University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa) SA Social Protest Observatory. Available at 
http://ccs.ukzn.ac.za/default.asp?2,27,3,1858 (accessed on 17 May 2013); De Visser J & Powell D “Service 
Delivery Protest Barometer 2007-2012” (2012) Multi-Level Government Initiative: Community Law Centre. 
Available at http://www.mlgi.org.za/barometers/service-delivery-protest-barometer (accessed on 15 
March 2013). 
23 Organised social movements, such as, the Shack Dwellers Movement, the Abahlali baseMjondolo 
Movement, the Unemployed People's Movement, and the Rural Network; and more recently the 
Democratic Socialist Movement and the Workers and Socialist Party. 
24 Madlingozi T “Post-apartheid social movements and legal mobilisation” in Langford M, Cousins B, 
Dugard J & Madlingozi T (eds) Symbols or substance: The role and impact of socio-economic rights 
strategies in South Africa (2013). 
25 Bangstad, Eriksen, Comaroff J & Comaroff JJ (2012) at 133; Alexander P “Rebellion of the poor: South 
Africa’s service delivery protests – a preliminary analysis” (2010) 37 Review of African Political Economy 
25. 
26 Mottiar S & Bond P “The politics of discontent and social protest in Durban” (2012) 37 Politikon 309. 
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often expressed differently in terms of a demand for basic services, resistance against 
displacement, and disconnection from water or electricity.27  When these groups 
express their anxiety about the material conditions threatening their existence they are 
often met with direct state resistance, political confrontation, and conflict with the law, 
and a disturbing feature is the involvement and interference of the growing private 
security sector.28 These protesting groups describe what is taking place as a “war 
against the poor” directed to “drive the poor out of the cities” and to contain them in 
“the human dumping grounds and repress” their “struggles”.29 
2.2 Complex legal organisation 
A report by the National Planning Commission (NPC) diagnoses the growing instability 
in State/citizen relations as a result of the complex nature of legal and political 
organisation and the obstacles faced by impoverished collectivities in their attempts to 
participate in decisions affecting their needs and living conditions. 30 The NPC argues: 
Giving voice to the poor and facilitating constructive participation, whether at a community level 
around service delivery, with organised labour, or with forums representing the unemployed, can 
contribute to building a strong, stable government. Such engagement enhances delivery, enables 
government to tailor policies to the needs of citizens and formulate an effective implementation 
plan, and can help secure buy-in from those most affected. To formulate and implement pro-poor 
policies there must be effective mechanisms for the voices of citizens to be heard, and the 
administrative and political elite must be prepared to listen to and engage with the views of the 
most marginalised.31 
The diagnostic report proposes to address these paucities by creating advisory councils 
to bring together policy-orientated academics and activists to advise government on 
anti-poverty measures, pro-poor agendas and pro-poor policies. The NPC, therefore, 
redirects engagement to be facilitated through formal processes and organisations 
while perceiving “impoverished” categories of people as a predefined and fixed group 
which is denied the ability to participate independently in decisions concerning its 
needs.32 As such it assigns attributes to “impoverished” individual/collective bodies 
without inquiring otherwise.33 It presumes that poverty is somehow built into the basic 
structure of society, including law systems. It suggests that “poor” people are somehow 
                                                 
27 Bangstad, Eriksen, Comaroff  & Comaroff (2012) at 133. 
28 McMichael C “South Africa: The South African Police Service and the public order war” Think Press 
Africa (3 September 2012). Available at http://thinkafricapress.com/south-africa/police-service-and-
public-order-war-saps-marikana-lonmin (accessed 3 April 2013). 
29 McMichael (2012); see also Cornell (21 May 2011).  
30 Department of the Presidency of South Africa: National Planning Commission Institutions and 
governance diagnostic report (2010) at 16-17. 
31 National Planning Commission (2010) at 16-17. 
32 National Planning Commission (2010) at 16-17. 
33 Ross T “The rhetoric of poverty: their immorality, our helplessness” (1991) 79 Georgetown Law Journal 
1499 at 1499-1500; Stewart L “The politics of poverty: Do socio-economic rights become real only when 
enforced by courts?” (2012) IV Diritto Pubblico Comparato ed Europeo 1510; Brand D Courts, socio-
economic rights and transformative politics (2009) at 65 -66, 151-152, 176-180, and 182-186. 
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illiterate, unable to speak for themselves and helpless. The Report appears to create a 
binary based on economic wealth between the haves and the have-nots.34  
John Comaroff claims that neo-liberal governance in post-colonies requires States 
to create complex legal systems as part of their bureaucratic functions, to manage the 
population.35 He asserts that adjudicatory and other legal measures often become the 
default mode of solving differences, protecting interests and demanding rights. He 
remarks that “the law does not, in itself, empower; nor does it yield an ordered world. 
That world, the shape of power within it, is produced as people seek to impose their 
wills on others by whatever means come to hand”, and he further warns that “legal 
instruments have become the weapon of first resort for many, often encouraged and 
facilitated by NGOs dedicated to the support of those who would otherwise lack the 
means to take their fights to the courts”.36  
Furthermore, the South African Constitution anticipates that a significant portion 
of social change should occur through judicial adjudication and choices made by the 
judiciary.37 In the context of the interpretation and implementation of socio-economic 
rights, the judiciary (as the least democratic branch of government) is thereby given the 
mandate to deal with complex issues regarding poverty, needs and social provisioning 
of the State. Apart from the mandate placed on the judiciary to interpret socio-economic 
rights, the legislature and executive also have a duty to define and implement socio-
economics rights. Legislation and policy are managed, administered and organised by 
three different branches of government, on three different levels of government 
(national, provincial and local). The functions of national, provincial and local 
government are further divided into different areas of competence on each level (for 
example, health, water, social security, housing etc). All this is overseen by various 
independent constitutionally mandated structures working with different segments of 
civil society involved formally and informally with socio-economic issues.38  
A complexity in legal organisation is thus inherent in the functioning of the State 
apparatus. Although it is often argued that the Constitution oversees the system and 
processes through the Constitutional Court, it is doubtful that the judiciary would be 
prepared to institute structural socio-economic change and in essence challenge its own 
institutional boundaries by fundamentally questioning the way legislation and policy 
are formulated, implemented or not implemented at all.39 For example, when the South 
                                                 
34 Ross (1991) at 1499. 
35 Bangstad, Comaroff & Comaroff  (2012) at 128. 
36 Bangstad, Comaroff & Comaroff (2012) at 128-129. 
37 Klare K “Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism” (1998) 14 SAJHR 149; see also Liebenberg 
(2010). 
38 Brand (2009) at 1-57; O’Conell (2011) at 551-552. 
39 This is typical of the tension between democracy and constitutionalism. See Christodoulidis E 
“Paradoxes of sovereignty and representation” (2002) TSAR 108; Brand “Judicial deference and 
democracy in socio-economic rights cases in South Africa” (2011) 22 Stellenbosch Law Review 614; Davis 
DM “The relationship between courts and the other arms of government in promoting and protecting 
socio-economic rights in South Africa: What about separation of powers?” 2012 Potchefstroom Electronic 
Law Journal  3. 
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African judiciary deals with the interpretation of socio-economic rights it side-steps 
giving content to these rights by addressing impoverishment through the creation of a 
“framework of procedures and institutions within which the market can work its 
distributive magic”.40  
Evans41 argues that the modern discourse of international human rights is 
primarily based on a legal as opposed to a political or a philosophical construct. These 
juridical procedures take the form of procedural repairs, such as, the clarification of 
legal rules or the creation of new juridical norms and principles. He proposes a more 
critical, substantive reconsideration of the effectiveness of the current register of 
international law, and challenges “our abilities to imagine new futures”.42 The fact that 
the human rights discourse is primarily a legal discourse aimed at procedural repairs is 
equally evident in the way the judiciary has dealt with some of the constitutional socio-
economic rights in South Africa.43 In cases where the judiciary was expected to make a 
decision on the positive obligation of the State to take measures to realise a socio-
economic right, the court was reluctant to provide normative content to socio-economic 
rights. The court argued that it was institutionally incapable, and ill-equipped, to deal 
with the complexity of socio-economic choices.44 The judiciary45 resorted to a 
procedural and formalistic approach, or so-called “good governance measures”, 
questioning the reasonableness of the measures taken by the State to realise these 
rights.46 In other cases,47 where courts have encouraged the political agency of 
collective bodies and have required government and the collective body to enter into 
meaningful engagement, the danger remains that “meaningful engagement as an 
adjudicatory strategy may descend into an unprincipled, normatively empty process of 
                                                 
40 Brand (2009) at 180 with reference to Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg & others 2010 (4) SA 
1 (CC). 
41 Evans T “International human rights law as power/knowledge” (2005) 27 Human Rights Quarterly 
1046 at 1056 
42 Evans (2005) at 1053 (my emphasis). 
43 The Government of the Republic of South Africa & others v Grootboom & others 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 
(CC); Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 72 (CC); Mazibuko & others v City of 
Johannesburg & others 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC). 
44 Brand (2011) at 614. O’Conell (2011) at 551-552 argues that the Mazibuko judgement resembles a 
court adhering to a neo-liberal world view which led to the “jettisoning of the transformative vision of the 
Constitution, and the recasting of the socio-economic rights guarantees as some form of hyper-procedural 
requirement, rather than a guarantee of substantive material change”. 
45 For example, in Mazibuko case the Constitutional Court observed that “...it is institutionally 
inappropriate for a court to determine precisely what the achievement of any particular social and 
economic right entails and what steps government should take to ensure the progressive realisation of 
the right. This is a matter, in the first place, for the legislature and executive, the institutions of 
government best placed to investigate social conditions in the light of available budgets and to determine 
what targets are achievable in relation to social and economic rights. Indeed, it is desirable as a matter of 
democratic accountability that they should do so for it is their programmes and promises that are 
subjected to democratic popular choice (para 61) and “Courts are ill-placed to make these assessments 
for both institutional and democratic reasons” (para 62). 
46 Brand (2011) at 614; Liebenberg (2010) at 470 & 466-480; O’Conell (2011) at 551-552. 
47 Such as Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC). 
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local dispute settlement”.48 Furthermore, in the context of socio-economic realities 
these “judicial procedures, interpretive methods and doctrinal categories” are often 
“blunt instruments for dealing with particularity and difference”.49 For example, when 
courts rely on predefined fixed identity categories, such as, “the vulnerable” and “the 
poor”, they create binary codes of categorical interpellations that often legitimise the 
existing social order and strengthen the dominant relations of power.  
2.3 The women of Marikana 
On 16 August 2012 in the area of Marikana, Rustenburg, on the platinum belt of the 
North West Province, the South African Police Force killed 34 and injured 78 protesting 
mineworkers during a labour wildcat strike.50 The event occurred in the context of 
abject poverty, sub-human living conditions and squalor that surrounded the mining 
area. The living and structural conditions in Wonderkop squatter camp where many of 
the diceased miners lived, have been described as deplorable, and in stark contrast to 
the wealth and mineral riches represented by the buildings of the world’s third biggest 
platinum producer, Lonmin Platinum Mines.51 In Wonderkop,  
Sewerage literally does flow through the streets, water is bought from the few that can afford to 
install a standpipe, shacks sit at lopsided angles facing onto narrow allies or deeply eroded dirt 
roads, there are no health services, no electricity, and schools are at a distance away.52  
Despite the mineral riches of the region poverty is stark.53 An estimated 67 per cent of 
the households, many of them headed by women, earn R 1 600 per month or less.54 
Hargreaves explains:  
People are here for work and survival reasons only – the men to work or have a chance to labour 
on the mines, and the women either having followed their men, or coming there to work on the 
mines or to benefit from the presence of male workers, some of them alone and distant from 
their families. 55  
                                                 
48 Liebenberg S “Engaging the paradoxes of the universal and particular in human rights adjudication: The 
possibilities and pitfalls of ‘meaningful engagement’” (2012) 12 African Human Rights Law Journal 1 at 12. 
49 Liebenberg (2012) at 6. 
50 Bond P “South Africa’s political economy after the Marikana massacre” (18 October 2012) Links 
International Journal Of Socialist Renewel. Available at http://links.org.au/node/3063 (accessed 22 
October 2012); Gilmore I “Marikana massacre: police shooting video footage” (27 January 2013) at 
Channel 4. Available at http://www.channel4.com/news/marikana-massacre-police-shooting-video-
footage (accessed 3 March 2013). 
51 Hargreaves S “And what of the women of Marikana?” (13 September 2012) Amandla Media. Available at 
http://amandla.org.za/amandla-magazine/124-amandla-issue-2627/1588-and-what-of-the-women-of-
marikana--by-samantha-hargreaves (accessed 12 May 2013). 
52 Hargreaves (13 September 2012).  
53 Bench Marks Foundation Rustenburg Community Report Johannesburg: Bench Marks Foundation (2011); 
Bench Marks Foundation Action Voices - Community Monitoring Project Johannesburg (2012). 
54 Hargreaves (13 September 2012). 
55 Hargreaves (13 September 2012). 
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She further reiterates that “not all women are there out of choice with the 2012 
Benchmarks report citing disturbing examples of women being 'imported' from 
Mozambique for the purpose of sex slavery”. 
The everyday violence experienced by the women in the area of Marikana 
received public attention after this event. The women in the area complained that, since 
the strike had begun about six weeks before the 16 August event, “women and children 
in Marikana have been subjected to daily harassment and intimidation, late-night police 
raids in which doors have been beaten down, and men beaten and arrested, and denied 
freedom of movement and association”.56 They further pointed out that the violence 
experienced by them as a result of the police action further coincided with a lack of 
“decent housing, adequate water and electricity, schools, medical facilities, sanitation, 
roads and other basic infrastructure in their communities”.57  
In reaction to the everyday violence experienced by women in the area and the 
brutal massacre of 16 August,58 the women of the Wonderkop Community Development 
Association attempted to organise a public demonstration to express their “unity, 
sorrow, outrage, and mourning that democracy is dying”.59 The Madibeng and 
Rustenburg Municipalities twice prohibited them from organising the protest.60 The 
only option left to them was to launch an urgent application with the High Court to get 
permission to exercise their right to assemble. The Centre for Applied Legal Studies 
(CALS) assisted them pro bono.61 This illustrates how vulnerable groups struggle to 
exercise a basic political right. It is ironic that the media should proclaim that they 
“won” the right when finally given permission to protest.62 In terms of section 17 of the 
                                                 
56 SABC “Woman’s death in Marikana prompts march” (22 September 2012) SABC News. Available at 
http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/57633c004ccf33729a3fdbb8fc2f576b/Womans-death-in-Marikana-
prompts-march-20120922  (accessed 12 May 2013). 
57 SABC (22 September 2012). 
58 De Waal M “SA’s banned gatherings: Goodbye Constitution, we hardly knew you” (28 September 2012) 
Daily Maverick. Availabe at http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2012-09-28-sas-banned-gatherings-
goodbye-constitution-we-hardly-knew-you#.UcGoDhbEO-I (accessed 12 May 2013); Wonderkop 
Community Women’s Association “North West High Court ruling that the Women of Marikana have the 
right to march” (27 September 2012) Creamer Media Reporter. Available at 
http://www.polity.org.za/article/sa-statement-by-wonderkop-community-womens-association-on-
north-west-high-court-ruling-that-the-women-of-marikana-have-the-right-to-march-29092012-2012-
10-29 (accessed 12 May 2013). 
59 SABC (22 September 2012). 
60 Duncan J & Royeppen A “Inside Rustenberg's banned protests” (7 March 2013) Perspective. Available at 
http://www.ru.ac.za/perspective/perspectivearticles/name,79323,en.html (accessed 12 May 2013); De 
Waal (28 September 2012). 
61 Hardy K “Urgent court proceedings brought- CALS assists women of Marikana” (28/9/2013) 
www.wits.ac.za/.../17091_academic_clm_law_cals_news_17091_news_it (accessed 20 June 2013). 
62 Wonderkop Community Women’s Association (27 September 2012); Du Plessis C “Marikana’s women 
win right to march” (29 September 2012) City Press. Available at 
http://www.citypress.co.za/news/marikanas-women-win-right-to-march-20120929/ (accessed 2 
February 2013). 
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Constitution “[e]veryone has the right, peacefully and unarmed, to assemble, to 
demonstrate, to picket and to present petitions”.63  
In what follows I discuss Deleuze and Guattari’s machinic ontology to describe 
their way of thinking about a subject as a process or assemblages forming a subject. I 
focus on their concepts “minority”, “majority” and “the State apparatus” to illustrate 
how collective bodies are captured, ordered and dealt with in constitutional rights 
processes because they do not conform to the standard of the majority whereby the 
rights and duties of citizens are measured by the axioms of a capitalist society. 
3 THE SUBJECT OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
3.1 Introduction 
In Negotiations, Deleuze emphasises that the formation of new forms of transcendence 
and new universals to produce a reflective subject as the subject of human rights is no 
philosophical advance.64 He argues that more is needed than a legally constituted 
subject to have human rights, because the subjectification of the social body is 
imperilled not only by economic constraints but also by regimes of signs, machines and 
collective assemblages of enunciation, such as, law, language, public opinion etc.65 
Deleuze further rejects any appeal to an abstract, fixed, predefined subject of human 
rights based on eternal values in a constitutional state, because for him such thinking 
blocks movement not only in law but also political thought and practice, and 
monopolises the possibilities presented by the acknowledgment of rights.66  
In the absence of transcendent values or any kind of transcendence the question 
arises how to engage with Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy to reach the necessary 
distance to enable us to assess the present.67 In A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia Deleuze and Guattari “contrast the plane of organisation or actuality, on 
which we encounter real things, real people and various kinds of becoming” with “the 
                                                 
63 This constitutional right is not unlimited but is curtailed by the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 
1993. The Act, adopted prior to the 1994 constitutional dispensation by the then Apartheid parliament, 
requires negotiations between the local authorities and the organisers of a social protest, which 
requirement entails the exercise of skills and resources to organize a public protest. Handmaker J & 
Berkhout R “Introduction to mobilising social justice: Critical discussions on the potential for civic action 
and structural change” in Handmaker J & Berkhout R (eds) Mobilising social justice in South Africa: 
Perspectives from researchers and practitioners (2010) 1 at 7; De Vos “A problematic limitation on the 
right to freedom of assembly” (6 October 2011) Constitutionally Speaking. Available at 
http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/a-problematic-limitation-on-the-right-to-freedom-of-assembly/ 
(accessed 22 June 2013). 
64 Deleuze (1995) at 152. 
65 Lazzarato M “The concepts of life and the living in the societies of control” in Fuglsang M & Sørensen 
BM (eds) Deleuze and the Social (2010) 171 at 172-173; Roffe J “The revolutionary dividual” in Hickey-
Moody & Malins (2007) 40 at 41. 
66 See Deleuze (1995) at 122; Patton (2010) at 23 & 152; Patton P “Immanence, transcendence, and the 
creation of rights” in De Sutter & McGee (2012) at 17; Lefebvre (2012) at 49-51. 
67 Patton (2012) at 15-16. 
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plane of immanence or virtuality, on which we encounter abstract machines, pure 
events and becoming-imperceptible”.68 Patton explains that Deleuzian criticism of the 
present is directed at identifying social or other movements in which becoming is 
expressed. 69 These becomings are processes of relative deterritorialisation which open 
the possibility for change. This kind of criticism “is always situational or site-specific. 
There is no master plan and no general recipe for effecting change in a particular 
direction”. In a political sense, societies are outlined by their deterritorialisation.70 
Patton explains that Deleuze and Guattari “mean that fundamental social change 
happens all the time, even as the society reproduces itself on other levels”.71 Change 
may happen in degrees or it may happen “through the eruption of events which break 
with the past and inaugurate a new field of social, political or legal possibilities”.72 
Deterritorialisation occurs when a process escapes or leaves a given territory, while 
reterritorialisation occurs when the deterritorialised elements recombine and enter 
into new relations which can either result in the composition of a new assemblage or 
the modification of old assemblages.73 Deterritorialisation may be negative or positive. 
Patton explains:  
[I]t is negative when the deterritorialized element is subjected to reterritorialization that obstructs 
or limits its line of flight. It is positive when the line of flight prevails over the forms of 
reterritorialization and manages to connect with other deterritorialized elements in a manner that 
extends its trajectory or even leads to reterritorialization in an entirely new assemblage. In this 
sense, they say, the effective transformation of a given field of reality requires the connection of 
deterritorialized elements in mutually supportive and productive ways rather than their 
conjugation within a new system of capture.74  
Furthermore, Deleuze and Guattari also distinguish between relative and absolute 
deterritorialisation. Relative deterritorialisation has to do with the historical 
relationship between things and the territories into which they are organised, including 
the manner in which these territories break down and change into new forms.75 
Absolute deterritorialisation occurs only in the virtual realm, while relative 
deterritorialisation occurs in the actual. This distinction between the virtual and the 
actual is fundamental to their ontology of assemblages because absolute 
deterritorialisation expresses their normative ideal, which forms the core of their 
ethics.76 The ethical principle of absolute deterritorialisation is a concept “of an 
abstract, nonorganic and creative life which is expressed in the positive or negative 
                                                 
68 Patton (2012) at 16. 
69 Patton (2012) at 16. 
70 Patton (2012) at 16. 
71 Patton (2010) at 73. 
72 Patton (2010) at 73. 
73 Patton P Political normativity and poststructuralism: The case of Gilles Deleuze (15 November 2007). 
Available at  http://www.uu.nl/sitecollectiondocuments/gw/gw_centre_humanities/political-
normativity-deleuze.pdf at 5; Deleuze G & Guattari F A thousand plateaus (tr Massumi B) (2005) at 509. 
74 Patton  (15 November 2007) at 5; Deleuze & Guattari (2005) at 220. 
75 Patton P “Becoming democratic” in Buchanan & Thoburn (2008) 178 at 179. 
76 Patton (15 November 2007) at 6. 
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deterritorialisation of existing assemblages and their reconfiguration into new 
assemblages”.77  
Patton explains that Deleuzian criticism of the present is directed at identifying 
social or other movements in which becoming is expressed. These becomings are 
processes of relative deterritorialisation which open the possibility for change. Patton 
emphasises that this kind of criticism “is always situational or site-specific. There is no 
master plan and no general recipe for effecting change in a particular direction”.78 
3.2 Assemblages produce the subject 
Deleuze is interested in subjectification because he asserts that:  
[I]t definitely makes sense to look at the various ways individuals and groups constitute 
themselves as subjects through processes of subjectification: what counts in such processes is the 
extent to which, as they take shape, they elude both established forms of knowledge and the 
dominant forms of power.79 
He further remarks 
[T]he way individuals and communities are constituted as subjects on the margins of established 
forms of knowledge and instituted powers, even if they thereby open the way for new kinds of 
knowledge and power. Subjectification thus appears as a middle term between knowledge and 
power, a perpetual ”dislocation,” a sort of fold, a folding or enfolding.80 
Deleuze and Guattari do not assume that the subject is somehow prior to society. They 
argue that machinic assemblages produce the subject.81 For them, the concept 
“assemblages” describes the joining of forces into relatively steady arrangements with 
particular capacities to affect and to be affected. They assert that any social formation 
limits or arranges movements or flows.82  
Assemblages, as conceived by Deleuze and Guattari, are complex constellations of 
objects, bodies, expressions, qualities, and territories that come together for varying 
periods of time, ideally to create new ways of functioning.83 They claim that human 
existence is affected by two kinds of assemblages: collective assemblages of 
enunciation,84 and machinic assemblages of desire.85 Collective assemblages of 
enunciation are acts and statements that encompass the signifying and interpreting 
activities and entail enacted rules and linguistic practices governing a subset of speech 
                                                 
77 Patton (15 November 2007) at 6. 
78 Patton (2012) at 16. 
79 Deleuze (1995) at 176. 
80 Deleuze (1995) at 150. 
81 Deleuze & Guattari (2005) at 171. 
82 Roffe (2007) at 40. 
83 Livesey G “Assemblage” in Parr A (ed) The Deleuze dictionary (2010) at 18. 
84 Roughly analogous to Foucault’s notion of discursive practices. Lorraine T Deleuze and Guattari’s 
immanent ethics (2011) at 13. 
85 Roughly analogous to Foucault’s notion of non-discursive practices. Lorraine (2011) at 13. 
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acts of the social field.86 Machinic systems of desire are bodies, actions and passions that 
include specific subsets of the habitual practices and routines bodies undergo.87 
Lorraine explains: 
What counts as meaningful speech is dictated not by an individual subject, but by the systems of 
“signifiance” that determine what makes sense in a given situation. What counts as a recognisable 
subject (to oneself as well as others) is dictated by systems of subjectification that determine a 
subject’s position vis- à- vis others.88 
Collective systems of enunciation include discursive practices, such as, the acts and 
statements involved in constitutional rights interpretation, adjudication, activism, 
translation and concretisation in policy, legislation and other measures taken by the 
judiciary, the State and formalised NGOs when dealing with these rights. These 
assemblages are complex because the State and other processes of power give 
expression to civil, political and socio-economic rights.89 Through its complex legal and 
political organisation the State creates striated space. This enables the State to control 
energy by creating inequalities and building a hierarchical system of relations into the 
legal and political system which places the occupants (such as, the youth, the elderly, 
the poor, the unemployed) of each stratum at odds with those of other strata, and acts 
as a system of capture.90 
Machinic systems of desire include bodies, actions and passions. They include 
various non-verbal expressions by collective bodies, such as, the dwellers in shack 
settlements, or groups who may occupy public spaces in the form of social protests. 
They include the structural and spatial conditions in which these bodies move, and 
incorporate their reactions and behaviour. In the context of inequality in South Africa 
and the displacement of so many impoverished collective bodies in South Africa, space 
is not only a geographical or physical location but is also a political apparatus of control, 
a part of the forces of production and/or reproduction of property relationships, a 
symbolic structure and a means of re-appropriation through resistance and other forms 
of expression.91  
3.3 Spatial boundaries and violence 
The structural and everyday violence imposed on impoverished individuals and 
collective bodies is also a product of spatial and structural living conditions that form 
part of the machinic systems of desire.92 It is evident from socio-economic rights case 
                                                 
86 Lorraine (2011) at 13; Livesey (2010) at 18. 
87 Lorraine (2011) at 13; Livesey (2010) at 18. 
88 Lorraine T “Majoritarian” in Parr (2010) at 153. 
89 See the discussion in section 2.2 above. 
90 Watson (2008) at 198. 
91 Lefebvre H The production of space (1991) at 249 & 394. 
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LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT/ VOL 18 (2014) 
Page | 15  
 
law that impoverished individuals and groups originate from outside the borders of 
urban societies,93 neglected94 and dilapidated inner city dwellings95 and transit camps.96  
The shack settlement situated around and in townships (former Black 
settlements) presents a particular space of contestation. These townships and shack 
settlements on the margins of South African cities originated with colonialism but were 
perpetuated with the apartheid legislation and policies.97 During apartheid the 
township was scientifically planned for purposes of control, and the plans included 
severe subjugation in conditions of poverty on a racial and class basis. Mbembe remarks 
that “space was therefore the raw material of sovereignty and the violence it carried 
with it”.98 He further argues that at present neo-liberalism and globalisation contribute 
to the violence of a specific component of the population because they force the 
redistribution of resources, which leads to displacement.99  
Pithouse describes the shack settlement as the space “where the refusal to accept 
that the human should be rendered as ‘waste’ has come to its most intense and 
sustained conflict with the state”.100 One of the reasons for this is because of the gravity 
of issues arising from this space. Apart from resisting their material conditions, 
impoverished collective bodies also continue to battle to represent themselves, to avoid 
political party structures or their representation by NGOs.101 Pithouse further argues 
that other reasons for resistance include State policy directed at the socio-political 
eradication of such bodies rather than at their support. He stresses 
[T]he fact that to step into the shack settlement is to step into the void. This is not because of any 
ontological difference amongst the people living there, or because life there is entirely other at the 
level of day-to-day sociality. It is because it is a site that is not fully inscribed within the laws and 
rules through which the state governs society. Because its meaning is not entirely fixed it is an 
unstable element of the situation. The unfixed way in which the shack settlement is indexed to the 
                                                 
93 For example,  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC); Pheko & others 
v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 2012 (2) SA 598 (CC); Occupiers of Portion R25 of the Farm 
Mooiplaats 355 JR v Golden Thread Ltd & others 2012 (2) SA 337 (CC); Occupiers of Skurweplaas 353 JR v 
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Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes & others 2009 (9) BCLR 847 (CC); Residents of Joe Slovo Community, 
Western Cape v Thebelisha Homes & others 2011 (7) BCLR 723 (CC). 
94 For example, Schubart Park Residents' Association & others v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality 
& another 2013 (1) BCLR 68 (CC). 
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97 Mbembe A “Necropolitics” (2003) 15 Public Culture 11 at 24-25. 
98 Mbembe (2003) at 24-25. 
99 Mbembe (2003) at 24-25.  
100 Pithouse RM “Thought amidst waste: Conjectural notes on the democratic project in South Africa. 
Paper presented at the Wits Interdisciplinary Seminar in the Humanities (WiSER): University of the 
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situation opens opportunity for a variety of challenges - from above and from below, democratic 
and authoritarian, in the name of the political, of tradition, of nationalism and of private interest, 
and from the left and the right - to the official order of things.102 
To live in these structural conditions has been described by John Comaroff as 
“unthinkable”. He goes on to describe “the alienation of increasing numbers of humans 
from the very condition of their humanity – [and] all this while the production of wealth 
and inequality proceeds apace”.103 In terms of spatial organisation, Henri Lefebvre104 
argues that the State as the active provider of infrastructure and the manager of 
resources is responsible for the creation of abstract space. It imposes spatial 
prohibitions and sanctions through the legal system. Abstract space is therefore 
characterised by normative and discursive non-aggression contracts and the coercive 
exercise of institutional power to preserve an apparently “non-violent” social order. In 
the latter context, space therefore also forms part of a complex legal organisation and a 
collective assemblage of enunciation.  
3.4 Minorities, the majority and the State 
Impoverished collectives, including the women of Marikana, have two things in 
common. Firstl, they struggle to broaden the base of those who count and enjoy the 
entire range of basic legal and political rights as citizens in a democratic constitutional 
State.105 As explained above, these individuals and groups need to approach the 
judiciary, civil society organisations and often inaccessible political channels to express 
their voices. Secondly, they constitute forces that question the legitimacy of decisions 
made by the government.106 This is visible both when they mobilise legally and in their 
other, unorthodox methods of taking action, such as occupying public space. The 
important question, however, is whether these assemblages manage to deterritorialise 
or even only relatively deterritorialise their suffering.  
Deleuze and Gauttari’s machinic ontology is “normative in a specific, formal 
sense”. It systematically prioritises different kinds of assemblages that deviate from the 
majoritarian standard. 107 Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of “minority” and “majority” 
therefore provide valuable pragmatic tools to focus on problems such as oppression 
under exploitative capitalist hierarchies, and they correspond well with the socio-
political struggles of “the poor, women, the young, the homeless, refugees, migrants”.108 
It is also important to keep in mind that these terms do not refer to any actual existing 
or corresponding minorities, majorities or States.  
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105 See Patton (2010) at 157; Conley (2010) at 166-168. 
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In A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Deleuze and Guattari 
proclaim “ours is becoming the age of minorities”.109 For them minorities as a concept 
are “‘fuzzy,’ nondenumerable, nonaxiomizable sets, in short, ‘masses,’ multiplicities of 
escape and flux” that are not defined by the “smallness of their numbers but rather by 
becoming or a line of fluctuation”. Although minorities may also be “objectively 
definable states, states of language, ethnicity, or sex with their own ghetto 
territorialities”, they advise us to think about minorities as “seeds, crystals of becoming 
whose value is to trigger uncontrollable movements and deterritorialisations of the 
mean or majority”.110 In other words, Deleuze and Guattari will advise us to think about 
the women of Marikana not only in terms of objectively definable states such as 
ethnicity, race and economic inequality but also in terms of social stratification. 
Their idea of a majority in contrast with the idea of a minority is always linked to a 
state of power and domination. Deleuze and Guattari describe the concept “majority” in 
constitutional democracies as an abstract figure, “the average adult-white-heterosexual-
European-male speaking a standard language”. 111 The latter forms the majority not in a 
quantitative sense, but as the historical standard whereby the rights and duties of 
citizens are measured by the axioms of a capitalist society.112 Therefore, the concept of 
“minority” in opposition to “majority” is not based on quantity. Indeed, the elements 
that make up social minorities may be greater in quantity than those in the apparent 
majority, and the minority as well as the majority encompass the relationship of a group 
to the larger collectivity of which they are parts.113 The majority, like the minority, can 
take various and simultaneous forms or have many elements.114 Patton argues that the 
majority is defined as the group which most closely approximates the “majority” 
standard, while the minority is defined by the gap which separates its members from 
that standard.115  “Minority” as a concept therefore refers to the “set of strategies and 
logics antithetical to the state axiomatic”.116 Deleuze remarks:  
What defines the majority is a model you have to conform to: the average European adult male city-
dweller, for example … A minority, on the other hand, has no model, it’s a becoming, a process. One 
might say the majority is nobody. Everybody’s caught, one way or another, in a minority becoming 
that would lead them into unknown paths if they opted to follow it through. When a minority 
creates models for itself, it’s because it wants to become a majority, and probably has to, to survive 
or prosper (to have a state, be recognized, establish its rights, for example).117 
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For Deleuze and Guattari the “State” as a concept is “an apparatus of organisation, 
capture and exclusion, which stratifies, polices, striates, codes/decodes, 
territorialises/detteritorialises, interiorises, counts, occupies, controls and regulates; it 
produces laws, feelings, identities, tools, workers and theorems”.118 Deleuze and 
Guattari argue that one of the fundamental tasks of the State apparatus is the striating of 
smoothed space.119  The State apparatus functions through the capture of movement 
and the partitioning of space. In other words, one of the functions of the State is to 
create complex legal organisation and to create hierarchical processes where people are 
placed at odds with each other. The State acts as a system of capture.120 Deleuze and 
Guattari121 further insist that the “axioms” of capitalist society constitute majorities. For 
them, “human rights have come to function as axioms within the immanent axiomatic of 
global capital”. Patton gives the example where  
[T]he basic civil and political rights regarded as human rights coexist alongside other axioms, such 
as those designed to ensure the security of property. The result is that when economic conditions 
demand the tightening of credit or the withdrawal of employment, the rights of the poor to basic 
social goods are effectively suspended.122  
Minorities are processes that operate according to different sets of strategies and logics 
antithetical to the state axiomatic. Because minorities operate on non-denumerable, 
non-axiomizable processes, their potential for transformation or deterritorialisation lies 
in their “own special power” to become or to create lines of flight.123 Minoritarian-
becomings, therefore, provide a way of broadening the base of the majority by affecting 
“the nature of the rights and duties attributed to the new majority”.124  
3.5 A minor conclusion 
As explained above, the social body is produced by collective systems of enunciation as 
well as machinic assemblages, and is also imperilled by economic constraints. I have 
referred to the escalating number of social protests in South Africa and the concerns of 
government to address the fact that masses of people are expressing their discontent. 
These aggregates of people not only continually struggle through different processes 
(social protest as well as legal and political processes) to broaden the base of the 
majority model, but they also continually and actively oppose the legitimacy of the 
decisions made by the State.125 It can be argued that these forms of resistance constitute 
a variety of processes (lines of flight, positive deterritorialisation or stratification) with 
the potential of changing the majority model.  
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While some of these “protesting” collectivities are based on underlying social 
networks, other social protests are spontaneous. Madlingozi argues that organised 
social movements are based on underlying social networks and have some degree of 
organisation, a collective identity and the capacity to maintain sustained challenges 
against the State and others.126  What is important, however, in terms of social 
stratification or positive deterritorialisation, is not a collective identity but the 
continued active involvement of the collective bodies occupying public space127 While 
organised social movements are based on underlying social networks and are focussed 
on broadening the base of the majority, spontaneous social protests, in Deleuzian terms, 
present infinite and multiple processes in which lines of flight may be established to 
continually challenge the very concept of majority and the privileges experiences by 
“the average adult-white-heterosexual-European-male speaking a standard language”. 
Butler, for example, argues that sometimes it is necessary to act before laying a 
claim. In other words, she suggests that impoverished collective bodies should occupy 
spaces in order to be recognised.128 Her argument corresponds to Henri Lefebvre’s 
argument that “groups, classes or fractions of classes cannot constitute themselves, or 
recognise one another as ‘subjects’ unless they generate (or produce) a space”.129 
Translated in the context of the neo-colonial South African nation state, this is exactly 
what collective bodies do when protesting against the State. They are attempting to 
“derealise” their suffering. Judith Butler (relying on the work of Gayatri Spivak) argues 
that in the context of post-colonialism, the Global South presents a situation where the 
only way to lay a claim to rights is through assimilation of the same Western juridical 
structures which were not only built on the exploitation of indigenous people but also 
continue to require that same “effacement and exploitation”.130 In other words, the only 
resort available to impoverished collective bodies is the very system that caused their 
oppression and exploitation, and which “othered” them as sub-human/non-human. In 
the context of constitutional socio-economic rights, this means that the only instrument 
available to impoverished social bodies is the discursive and non-discursive practices 
presented by their constitutional rights. Costas Douzinas identifies this paradox and 
remarks that the greatest achievement of universal human rights is that it has ”imposed 
the ideology of the rich on the poor”.131 Douzinas further argues that every time an 
oppressed or poor person uses the language/discourse of rights to protest, resist, and 
fight she draws from and connects with the transcendent metaphysics, morality and 
politics of the Western World.132  
Once the body is recognised and made “real” as a subject, the critical question 
remains whether or not the current constitutional rights processes, in so far as they are 
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based on a fixed concept of the human and appeal to transcendent values, concepts of 
history or human nature, are able to address the needs of a minority. In other words, 
once the women of Marikana have been allowed to protest and voice their grief, 
concerns and anger, are the current law and political system able to address the 
everyday violence experienced by them?  
In his critique of human rights discourse, Deleuze suggests we should reject 
universal human rights in so far as they are based on a fixed concept of the human and 
appeal to transcendent values, concepts of history or human nature.133 As already 
explained, Deleuze refuses to accept any representation of a fixed concept of the subject 
in law and political thought. Together with Guattar,134 Deleuze argues that universal 
human rights presuppose an abstract subject of rights that cannot be reduced to any 
singular, existent figures. These rights belong to everyone but to no one in particular.135 
Therefore, these rights “say nothing about the immanent modes of existence of people 
provided with rights”.136 Human rights discourse is based on the idea of the majority or 
the model you have to conform to, “the average adult-white-heterosexual-European-
male speaking a standard language”, and that is why these abstract constitutional rights 
are unresponsive to the everyday violence and needs of minorities, such as the women 
of Marikana. In other words, although these collective bodies sometimes manage to 
deterritorialise social, political or legal possibilities these processes are often subjected 
to reterritorialisation that obstructs or limits their line of flight because of the abstract 
construction of the subject as a predefined and fixed concept. 
4 CONCLUSION 
This article has questioned the disjunction between the lived realities of impoverished 
social bodies and the language, politics and practices of human or constitutional rights 
that represent them. I argued that when bodies have limited or no access to water, 
sanitation, shelter, adequate food and healthcare this is not merely an infringement of 
their rights but it is also a form of systematic and structural violence shaping their 
everyday existence. I have further argued that the very problem with rights discourse is 
that it exists in the frame of representational thought and the notion of a predefined and 
fixed concept of the subject and transcendent values and morality. Deleuze views this as 
a limitation on “possibility and experimentation”, but in the context of the African body, 
representational thought based on a fixed concept of the subject and transcendent 
values also allows for the continued differentiation and exploitation of those who do not 
conform to the majority model. Constitutional rights discourse and practices, in so far as 
they are based on a fixed notion of a subject and transcendent values, present 
hierarchical methods of State capture that serve the broader capitalist market. This 
modernist legal construction of the subject is possibly one of the main reasons for the 
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multitude of heterogeneous processes by which impoverished collective bodies in the 
neo-colonial, post-apartheid nation state actively continue to struggle to deterritorialise 
their suffering. The question nevertheless remains how these multitudes may present 
lines of flight to broaden the base of the current majority standard or alternatively 
manage to make the future that of an age of becoming minorities.  
 
 
